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The First Amendment as a Shield to
Eminent Domain - An Opportunity

for Responsibility in Pennsylvania
I. INTRODUCTION - A MODERN-DAY HORATIO ALGER
CONFRONTS THE STATE

George Androtsakis came to the United States from Greece in
1968.1 He found work as an usher in a movie theatre.2 From there
he worked his way up in the movie industry, eventually becoming
the owner of a number of theatres featuring foreign-language,
mainstream, and adult films.' One of his concerns is the Garden
Theatre.4 The Garden is located on North Avenue, the primary
thoroughfare of the Central Northside neighborhood of Pittsburgh,
Pennsylvania. The theatre faces an 80-acre urban park and is
bordered on one side by a partially re-gentrified residential
neighborhood and on the other by a small business district and a
hospital campus.
In 1995, the Pittsburgh City Council approved a plan for the redevelopment of the neighborhood based on concerns of decline that
dated back to the late 1960's.5 The plan provided that the area
had once been a viable mixed-use neighborhood but that the district had deteriorated, creating blight that discouraged maintenance and reinvestment in the area.6 The plan outlined a comprehensive redevelopment project for the neighborhood stating that
its purpose was to correct blighting conditions, improve the city's
tax base, stabilize the commercial market by removing inappropriate land use, and provide sites for new business development
through new construction and rehabilitation compatible with the
historic surroundings.!

1. Suzanne Elliott, Owner of Garden Theatre Appeals Decision Allowing Property
Seizure, PIrrSBURGH Bus. TIMES, June 14, 2002.
2. Id.
3. Id.
4. Id.
5. Brief of Appellee at *9, In the Matter of Condemnation by the Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh, 823 A.2d 1086 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (2003 WL 23709312).
6. Id.
7. Id. at *10.
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Unfortunately for Mr. Androtsakis, the Garden Theatre, which
shows adult films, featured prominently in the City's plans for
redevelopment. The redevelopment plan noted that the theatre is
the largest and most centrally located building on its historically
significant block.8 The City proposed that the theatre would be
used together with an adjacent Masonic Temple as a performing
arts, cultural and community activities venue and would serve as
a key component of the redevelopment and a major draw for other
reinvestment.9 The Urban Redevelopment Authority ("URA") of
Pittsburgh filed a declaration of taking on May 9, 1997, and Mr.
Androtsakis filed objections.1" Thus, the Garden Theatre became a
battleground between the business owner who declared dominion
over his property and asserted his right to be unencumbered in
the display of adult films and the City that demanded the right to
fight the deleterious effects of urban decay.
Section II of this article will examine federal jurisprudence concerning the takings powers of the Fifth Amendment, and First
Amendment protections that may serve as a defense to the use of
that power. Next, Section III will consider the same issues under
the Pennsylvania Constitution which can provide broader protections to state citizens than the federal baseline. Finally, with an
eye towards the pending decision on the matter by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, Section III will analyze the Garden Theatre
case under both the federal and state constitutions in an attempt
to frame some conclusions regarding the constitutionally of the
taking of Mr. Androtsakis' theatre.
II. FEDERAL JURISPRUDENCE REGARDING EMINENT DOMAIN

A.

Eminent Domain
Nor shall privateproperty be taken for public use, without
just compensation."

The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment illustrates the
power of the federal government to take possession of private land
subject to the limitation that the property must be taken for the
use of the public and that a fair price must be paid to the private
8.

Id. at *12.

9. Id.
10. In the Matter of Condemnation by Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh,
823 A.2d 1086, 1088 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003).
11. U.S. CONST. amend. V.

Spring 2006

The First Amendment & Eminent Domain

489

property owner. The first restriction ensures that the government
will act to the benefit of the public at large when it burdens a private party. The second restriction guarantees fair compensation
for that burden.
B.

Standardof Review for Eminent Domain

The courts are highly defferential when the government exercises the power of eminent domain. The Supreme Court recently
reaffirmed this level of deference in Kelo v. City of New London
stating, "Our review is limited to determining that the purpose is
legitimate and that Congress rationally could have believed that
the provisions would promote that objective."12 The Court in Kelo
makes it clear that it is the province of the legislature to determine what land will be taken and that the courts will only judge
that the purpose was legitimate and the means were rational. 3
Further, the scope of that legitimate purpose is fairly broad. The
government is restricted to taking private property for a public
use. The Court in Kelo held that economic development alone was
a legitimate public use even if the land that was taken was given
to private parties to effectuate that public use. 4
C.

FirstAmendment Standard- A Second Line of Defense

The guarantees of the First Amendment give a private property
owner a second line of defense against a taking if the property
owner can claim that the taking impermissibly encroaches on protected speech. When the government's exercise of the takings
power collides with the protections of the First Amendment the
level of judicial scrutiny applied will depend on the intention of
the government. If the sovereign suppresses or discriminates
against protected speech because of the content of that speech, the
government action is subject to strict scrutiny, a standard that
requires a compelling state interest that cannot be achieved by
any less restrictive means." But in land use cases the government
can maintain that it acts under its general police powers to promote the health, safety, and welfare of the citizenry, not to burden
12. 125 S. Ct. 2655, 2668 (2005) (citing Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto, Co., 467 U.S. 986
(1984)).
13. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2667-68 (citing Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467 U.S.
229, 242 (1984) and Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 35-36 (1954)).
14. Kelo, 125 S.Ct. at 2666-67.
15. Clark v. Cmty. For Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984).
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protected speech. 6 A general law that is neutrally applied is
judged under the intermediate scrutiny standard set forth in
United States v. O'Brien.7 The O'Brien test requires that:
(1) the action is within the constitutional powers of the
government; (2) the action furthers important or substantial government interests; (3) the interests furthered are
unrelated to the suppression of free speech; (4) the restriction of First Amendment Freedom is no greater than
is essential
to the furtherance of the government inter8
est.
One of the areas where the Takings Clause and the First
Amendment often conflict is in the area of adult uses of property.
The government justifies taking the property by declaring the taking a content-neutral means of combating adverse secondary effects such as crime and neighborhood blight. The landowner argues that the government's primary goal is the suppression of protected speech. 9
1.

An Application of the FirstAmendment Defense

The Second Circuit case of G. & A. Books provides an excellent
example of the application of the O'Brien test in the federal courts.
The state of New York invoked its powers of eminent domain in a
comprehensive plan to eliminate blight and to rehabilitate the 42d
Street/Times Square area of New York City.2 ° The plaintiffs in the
action were retailers of sexually-oriented books, magazines, films
and videotapes as well as exhibitors of sexually-oriented films and
performances. 2' The Second Circuit used the O'Brien test to affirm
the order of the lower court to dismiss the plaintiffs claim that the
condemnation action impermissibly burdened the plaintiffs free16. Zahn v. Board of Public Works, 274 U.S. 325 (1927).
17. 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968).
18. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377. The Court noted that when "'speech' and 'nonspeech'
elements are combined in the same course of conduct, a sufficiently important governmental interest in regulating the nonspeech element can justify incidental limitations of First
Amendment freedoms." Id.
19. Films, including sexually explicit films, are a protected form of speech. See Joseph
Burstyn, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495, 502 (1952) and Young v. American Mini Theatres,
427 U.S. 50 (1976). A particular film or other work or performance is presumed to be protected unless it is found to be obscene under the standard announced in Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
20. G. & A. Books, Inc., 770 F.2d 288, 291 (2d Cir. 1985).
21. G. & A. Books, 770 F.2d at 290.
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dom of speech.2 Most notably the court observed that the suppression of sex-related businesses may have been a factor in designing the project, but that a subjective motivation on the part of
some proponents of the project to suppress sex-related businesses
did not render it unconstitutional, provided the project was justified by substantial government interests independent of such motive.23
In other words, as long as the government can articulate legitimate interests that are valid, it is immaterial if concurrent animus actually existed towards protected speech. In this case, the
government expressed its interest as the desire to improve the
buildings in the area, promoting use up to the permitted zoning
potential, increasing tax revenue, raising employment, saving architectural and historically significant buildings and reducing
crime.2 '4 The district court had in fact remarked that the project's
planners had displayed a pronounced hostility to adult uses that
appeared to reflect official City and State policy. 25 The district
court concluded that eradicating pornography may have been an
unofficial goal, but it was not the primary purpose of the project. 6
The court stated, "It strained credibility to assert that the City
and State would undertake such a massive project.., to rid Times
Square of a handful of pornographic bookstores and a few adult
movie theatres."2 ' The court further concluded that the condemnation proceedings were not content-based because defendants did
not single out plaintiffs speech for special treatment.2 8' The plaintiffs business would be closed in a neutral fashion along with
hundreds of others. 9
The District Court of the South District of New York relied on
its decision in G. & A. Books when it considered a second case concerning eminent domain for the Times Square Redevelopment. In
Forty-Second Street Co. v. Koch, the owners of a movie theatre
slated for redevelopment challenged the redevelopment project on
the same First Amendment grounds.30 The court upheld the eminent domain action against claims by the theatre owners that
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 297-98.
Id. at 297.
Id. at 296-97.
G. & A. Books, Inc., 604 F. Supp. 898, 904 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
G. & A. Books, 694 F. Supp. at 905.
Id.
Id. at 909.
Id.
Forty-Second Street Co. v. Koch, 613 F. Supp. 1416 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
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their properties were being singled out because of objections to the
speech content of the films displayed." In addition to the rationale of G. & A. Books, the district court noted that the O'Brien test
does not require that the government demonstrate a nexus between the theatres themselves and the blight in Times Square only that the condemnation of the theatres serve an important
state purpose unrelated to the suppression of speech.32 Further,
the court clarified that the O'Brien test only requires that the
court determine that the government interests are legitimate, not
that they are, "positive, well thought out, or well served by the
plan at hand."3' The legitimate state interest need not be the least
restrictive alternative; the government must simply show that its
interest would be served less effectively without the regulation
that incidentally burdens speech.3 4
D.

Conclusion as to the State of FederalLaw

Eminent domain actions may be used to take properties where
the intent to discriminate against protected speech exists concurrently with legitimate rationales. This will pass constitutional
muster under the intermediate scrutiny of the O'Brien test so long
as the discriminatory intent is not the primary focus of the regulation. As long as a legitimate government interest can be articulated, impermissible secondary motives will not hinder government action that incidentally burdens speech. The Supreme
Court's ruling in Kelo serves to reinforce this policy by giving
great weight to economic development initiatives. The third prong
of the O'Brien test requires an important government interest and
by firmly establishing economic development as a valid public use
the court may have strengthened the argument that economic development will be adjudicated an important government interest.
And because the O'Brien test is limited to considering the legitimacy of the government's interest, but never the effectiveness of
these initiatives in achieving their intended goal, the law does little to assure property owners that the sacrifice of their property
has any guarantee of actually serving the public good.

31.
32.
33.
34.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.

at
at
at
at

1420.
1427.
1425.
1427.

Spring 2006

The First Amendment & Eminent Domain

493

This trend in constitutional jurisprudence has been heavily
criticized as a threat to the property rights of the individual.3 5
First Amendment protections are jealously guarded as they create
a space for the free dissemination of ideas. It could be argued that
property rights create a space for the execution of ideas and
should therefore be protected with an equal level of judicial scrutiny.3" Justice Anthony Kennedy has written: "Individual freedom
finds tangible expression in property rights."" This is especially
true when the control of property creates a forum for expression
and the dissemination of ideas.
But, under federal law, private property rights are not inviolate
when an individual uses his property to the detriment and harm
of the community." In the arena of adult uses, the Supreme Court
of the United States has justified applying a content-neutral level
of scrutiny to land-use restrictions by explaining that government
actions are not aimed at content of the speech disseminated on the
property but rather the negative secondary effects of adult uses
such as deteriorating property values and crime.39 The majority in
Kelo further emphasized that the concept of the public welfare is
broad and inclusive and that the values it represents are spiritual
as well as physical, aesthetic as well as monetary. ° This judicial
policy of deference to legislative ends for the dominion of property
has resulted in a shift away from valuing the property rights of
the individual to a larger concern that land use will be for the
benefit of the community as a whole with the goal of reducing
blight and crime or simply increasing the value of the land use for
the purpose of economic development."
If the Garden Theatre case is decided under federal constitutional law, then it will likely be found analogous to G. & A. Books
35. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2677 (O'Connor, J., Thomas, J., dissenting).
36. See Richard A. Epstein, Property, Speech and the Politics of Distrust, 59 U. CGi. L.
REV. 41 (1992) (arguing that even if the First Amendment has a dominant place, the takings clause should be "more resistant to encroachment by the police powers of the state.")
37. United States v. James Daniel Good Real Property, 510 U.S. 43, 61 (1993).
38. In her dissenting opinion in Kelo, Justice O'Connor argues that a public purpose is
realized when a taking eliminates a harmful use of property. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2674-75
(O'Connor, J., Thomas, J., dissenting). But O'Brien requires no evidentiary hearing showing that the threatened harm was real. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
39. See, e.g., City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); City of Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50 (1976).
40. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2663 (citing Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 33 (1976)).
41. The Kelo majority notes that some Amici briefs argued that private developers have
sufficient power to amass land for beneficial use, while others argue that where there is an
over-division of land there is a true impediment to land assembly for any purpose and making the use of eminent domain necessary. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668.
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and Forty-Second Street Co. As in those cases, the taking will be
considered a general law that incidentally burdens speech making
the intermediate scrutiny of the O'Brien test applicable. Under
that test the taking passes constitutional muster as it is within
the eminent domain power of the local government to take the
theatre and, like in the Times Square cases, the taking will further the important interest of the government in halting urban
decay. Further, the interest in arresting urban decay is unrelated
to free speech and the restrictions are no greater than what is essential to the furtherance of the government interest. Put simply,
the First Amendment will offer no more protection to Mr. Androtsakis than it offers to the owner of the barber shop or the hotdog
stand on the next street over, because the law has been neutrally
applied to all of them and any impact on free speech is incidental.
III. EMINENT DOMAIN JURISPRUDENCE IN PENNSYLVANIA
A.

Eminent Domain

Article I section 10 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides,
"[Nior shall private property be taken or applied to public use,
without authority of law and without just compensation being first
made or secured."" Pennsylvania has interpreted this language to
parallel the eminent domain jurisprudence of the federal courts, so
the analysis of a taking in Pennsylvania does not differ from an
analysis under federal law.43
B.

Heightened Protectionsfor Speech in Pennsylvania

States are empowered to provide additional protection to their
citizens beyond the minimum threshold of federal guarantees.
The Kelo majority specifically notes that a state is free to place
further restrictions on its own exercise of the takings power in
order to protect the individual property rights of its citizens."
Pennsylvania has often exercised its prerogative to provide constitutional protections in excess of the federally mandated baseline
especially in the area of free speech.'
42.

PA. CONST. art. I, §10.

43. See KEN GOEmLEY & JEFFREY BAUMAN, THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION §
13.4[a] (1st ed. 2004).
44. Kelo, 125 S. Ct. at 2668. Presumably this comment was aimed at the legislature.
45. See Commonwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382 (Pa. 1981), where the court noted that
freedom of expression:
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The Kandyland Theatre Cases - Free Speech Standardof
Review

In 1998, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court heard the Kandyland
Theatre case, City of Erie v. Pap'sA.M.46 The original ruling of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down a city ordinance which
would have prevented erotic dancers from performing in the
nude.4 7 In 2000, the U.S. Supreme Court vacated the ruling of the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court and upheld the ordinance on federal
grounds." On remand, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania turned
to the Pennsylvania Constitution to strike the ordinance in a case
that came to be known as Pap'sH."
a.

City of Erie v. Pap's A.M. - The PennsylvaniaSupreme Court, Round One

In City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., the plaintiff operated an establishment known as "Kandyland" which featured nude erotic dancing.5" The plaintiff objected to a city ordinance banning nudity
that would have presumably required the dancers to cover themselves with what are commonly referred to as "pasties" and "Gstrings. " " The Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the ordinance as a violation of free speech rights.5 2

has special meaning for this Commonwealth, whose founder, William Penn,
was prosecuted in England for the "crime" of preaching to an unlawful assembly and persecuted by the court for daring to proclaim his right to a trial by an
uncoerced jury. It is small wonder, then, that the rights of freedom of speech,
assembly, and petition have been guaranteed since the first Pennsylvania Constitution, not simply as restrictions on the powers of government, as found in
the Federal Constitution, but as inherent and "invaluable" rights of man.
Tate, 432 A.2d at 1388.
"Itwas, of course, not until the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted in 1868 that
the freedoms of speech and press were accorded federal protection against adverse state
action." William Goldman Theatres v. Dana, 173 A.2d 59, 62 (Pa. 1961) (emphasis in original). Pennsylvania courts interpreted article I, section 7 long before the Fourteenth
Amendment provided a basis for application of the First Amendment against the states;
i.e., before there was an applicable federal interpretation to consider. See, e.g., Respublica
v. Dennie, 4 Yeates 267, 1805 WL 911 (Pa. 1805).
46. Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273 (Pa. 1998).
47. Pap'sA.M., 719 A.2d at 279.
48. City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000).
49. Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 812 A.2d 591, 593-94 (Pa. 2002).
50. Pap's A.M. v. City of Erie, 719 A.2d 273, 279 (Pa. 1998).
51. Pap'sA.M., 719 A.2d at 279.
52. Id.
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Pap's I - The United States Supreme Court Overrules Pennsylvania

Justice O'Connor wrote the opinion for the United States Supreme Court's plurality in City of Erie v. Pap's A.M., which overturned the original decision by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court.5 3
The plurality held that the City of Erie's restrictions on public nudity were content-neutral and properly aimed at combating the
secondary effects of nude dancing rather than suppressing the
erotic message communicated by the nude dance.' The plurality
analyzed the ordinance under the intermediate scrutiny of O'Brien
as a content-neutral restriction on symbolic speech.5 5 The plurality concluded that the government's goal of guarding against the
harmful secondary effects of nude dancing outweighed any restriction on that conduct. Ultimately, even if one purpose of the statute was to suppress the erotic message of the dance, the "illicit
motive" was irrelevant because the ordinance had a concurrent
proper motive.5"
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, concurred only in the
judgment.5 7 The Justices deemed the Erie ordinance to be a general law regulating conduct, not expression, and thus not subject
to First Amendment scrutiny. 8 Justice Souter filed a concurring
and dissenting opinion agreeing that the O'Brien test governed
but dissenting from the application of the test.55 Justice Souter
noted that the record did not reveal "any evidence on which Erie
may have relied, either for the seriousness of the threatened harm
or for the efficiency of its chosen remedy" and therefore the record
did not permit the conclusion that the regulation was reasonably
designed to mitigate "real harms."' He further commented that
53. Pap's1, 529 U.S. at 293.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 296.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 302.
58. Pap's I, 529 U.S. at 307-08.
59. Id. at 314 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
60. Id. at 317. The Kelo majority noted that O'Brien requires no evidentiary hearing
showing that the threatened harm was real. Id. at 299. In order to show that secondary
effects of protected activity pose a threat, the city need not "conduct new studies or produce
evidence independent of that already generated by other cities" to demonstrate the problem
of secondary effects, "so long as whatever evidence the city relies upon is reasonably believed to be relevant to the problem the city addresses." Id. at 296 (citing City of Renton,
475 U.S. at 51-52). The majority asserted that the city of Erie could rely on the evidentiary
foundation set forth in City of Renton and American Mini Theatres for the rule that secondary effects are caused by the presence of even one adult entertainment establishment in a
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zoning to control the location of nude dancing would allow for efficient law enforcement, restrict its effect on property values, and
limit the exposure of the public with less restriction on protected
speech.6
Justice Stevens filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice
Ginsberg expressing disagreement with the plurality's use of the
secondary effects doctrine.62 In his view, the "secondary effect" of
commercial enterprises featuring adult entertainment established
a legitimate basis to regulate only the location of the business, not
a "total suppression of protected speech." 3
c.

Pap's II - The PennsylvaniaSupreme
Court,Round Two

According to the U.S. Supreme Court, the Erie ordinance passed
federal constitutional muster, but Justice Castille, writing for the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, turned to the Pennsylvania Constitution." Article I, section 7 provides: "[Tihe free communication of
thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and
every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject,
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty." 5 The court outlined a lengthy examination of precedent that this language extended protection more broad than the Federal Constitution.6
The court then noted that a majority of the U.S. Supreme Court
approved the O'Brien test as the appropriate standard of review
for the case, but that no majority of the Court had made a clear
holding as to the evidentiary standard necessary to satisfy the
test.67 The Pennsylvania Supreme Court determined that, as it
had done it the past, it would reject intermediate scrutiny as a
test where "reasonable minds can disagree" when balancing the
stated purpose of a statute against the extent of its impact upon

given neighborhood. Pap's 1, 529 U.S. at 296 (citing City of Renton, 475 U.S. 51-52 and
American Mini Theatres, 427 U.S. at 50). Lastly the majority defers to the city council
members of Erie who could make, "particularized, expert judgments about the resulting
secondary effects," much like an administrative agency. Pap's 1, 529 U.S. at 297-98.
61. Id. at 315.
62. Id. at 317.
63. Pap's 1, 529 U.S. at 317-18.
64. Pap'sH, 812 A.2d at 593.
65. PA. CONST. art I, § 7.
66. Pap's II, 812 A.2d at 603-09.
67. Id. at 609.
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protected expression." The court determined that there was no
legal precedent in federal or Pennsylvania law which required it to
deem the illicit purpose of the ordinance irrelevant or to compel
the court to analyze the provisions under an O'Brien-type intermediate scrutiny.69
Therefore the court began its analysis by asking if the ordinance
burdened protected expression and, if so, whether it could survive
strict scrutiny.7 ° The court determined that one of the obvious
purposes of the ordinance was to burden freedom of expression
and therefore there was a "content-based motivation to suppress
the expressive nature of the dance."7 The court then held that
under the Pennsylvania Constitution an intermediate level scrutiny, such as the test in O'Brien, was always inappropriate when
expressive conduct such as nude dancing was involved.7 2 The Erie
ordinance must then survive a strict scrutiny analysis requiring
that the regulation must be "narrowly drawn to accomplish a
compelling governmental interest."7 3 The governmental interest
involved was an interest in deterring sex crimes, but the court
found that the ordinance was not narrowly tailored to meet this
compelling interest.74 The court noted that there were contentneutral time, place, and manner restrictions more narrowly tailored to the government's purpose such as requiring a minimum
distance between dancers and patrons, limiting nude entertainment to certain hours, or zoning regulations to disperse adult establishments.75

68. Id. at 611. The court noted that it had previously rejected an intermediate scrutiny
test that requires the restriction be no more extensive than necessary to accomplish the
government interest because "[r]easonable minds can disagree as to how extensive any
given regulation should be with respect to its purpose, and the perspective of the United
Sates Supreme Court on this issue may not be the same as that of a court within a state
jurisdiction," and that the resulting "differences of opinion may be based in part on differing jurisprudential theories of the function and responsibilities of government, but they
may be based also on a regional, versus a national perspective." Id. at 609-10 (citing Ins.
Adjustment Bureau v. Ins. Comm'r, 542 A. 2d 1317, 1324 (Pa. 1988)).
69. Pap's II, 812 A.2d at 610.
70. Id. at 611.
71. Id. at 611-12. The preamble of the ordinance declares that the intent of the regulation is to "limit a recent increase in nude live entertainment within the City, which activity
adversely impacts and threatens to impact the public health, safety and welfare by providing an atmosphere conducive to violence, sexual harassment, public intoxication, prostitution, the spread of sexually transmitted disease and other deleterious effects." Id. at 594.
72. Id. at 612.
73. Id.
74. Pap'sII, 812 A.2d at 612.
75. Id. at 612-13.
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Justice Saylor dissented from the majority opinion in Pap's H.7"
In his view it was appropriate to give more weight to the stated
purpose of the ordinance, to combat the negative secondary effects
of crime caused by the presence of adult entertainment." He did
note that there are legitimate concerns about "unmentioned pur78
poses" of regulations which may impact protected expression.
But rather than extend the strict scrutiny test to this area, he
would adopt the more stringent application of the O'Brien test en7
dorsed by Justice Souter in his concurring opinion in Pap's I.1
This would require an evidentiary basis for alleged secondary effects and the remedial potential of the proposed regulation. °

IV. THE GARDEN THEATRE CASE
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania recently heard oral arguments concerning the nexus of free speech and eminent domain in
Condemnation by Urban Redevelopment Authority of Pittsburgh."'
As previously stated, the case arose when the City of Pittsburgh
initiated a condemnation action to acquire the Garden Theatre
and forty-six surrounding properties comprising three-square
blocks of the Central Northside Neighborhood of Pittsburgh. 2
George Androtsakis, the sole shareholder of New Garden Realties
objected to the taking under both the First Amendment and Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.' This case will
allow the Pennsylvania Supreme Court to define the protection
that freedom of speech can provide against a governmental takings of property in Pennsylvania.

76. Id. at 613 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Pap'sII, 812 A.2d at 613 (Saylor, J., dissenting).
80. Id. In Pap's I, Justice Souter notes that intermediate scrutiny requires a regulating
government to make some demonstration of an evidentiary basis to show that harm flows
from an expressive activity and that the restriction will alleviate that harm. Pap's I, 529
U.S. at 311 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). But the evidentiary basis
may be borrowed from the records made by other governments if it is germane and actually
replied upon. Id. at 313. Reliance may be shown by invocation of the judicial opinion as
evidentiary foundation. Id.
81. Condemnation by URA, 823 A.2d at 1086.
82. Id. at 1089.
83. Id. at 1088-89.
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ProceduralHistory

Mr. Androtsakis, the sole shareholder of New Garden Realty,
filed objections once the City of Pittsburgh moved to take his theatre.' The Common Pleas Court of Allegheny County ruled that
the taking was constitutional.85 On appeal, the Commonwealth
Court of Pennsylvania upheld the ruling of the lower court.86
Judge Smith-Ribner, writing for the Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania, first considered the case under the precedent provided by Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc." In Arcara a bookstore that
sold adult books was closed under a public health statute after
complaints were made of illegal sexual activity in the store.8 The
U.S. Supreme Court noted that the crucial distinction in the case
was that the sexual activity proscribed involved no element of protected expression.8 9 The Court held, "neither the press nor booksellers may claim special protection from governmental regulations of general applicability simply by virtue of their First
Amendment protected activities."" The Commonwealth Court of
Pennsylvania held that the Urban Redevelopment Law is a law of
general applicability that authorizes the URA to promote economic redevelopment and combat urban blight.9 1 Under Arcara
the URA's exercise of a generally applicable power to use eminent
domain to combat blight did not "transform the taking into a 'time,
place and manner' restriction on free speech."92
Although it decided the case under Arcara, the Commonwealth
Court considered New Garden Realty's remaining First Amendment arguments. 93 New Garden Realty first asserted that by rejecting strict scrutiny the trial court failed to address whether the
taking of the Garden Theatre would leave ample alternative avenues for communication of films with adult themes. '
New Garden Realty then asserted that strict scrutiny review should apply
because the URA's stated purpose in precluding adult films in the
redevelopment area was to change the "negative image" that re84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.

Id. at 1088.
Id.
Condemnation by URA,
478 U.S. 697 (1986).
Condemnation by URA,
Condemnation by URA,
Id.
Id. at 1094.
Id.
Id.
Condemnation by URA,

823 A.2d at 1098.
823 A.2d at 1093 (citing Arcara,478 U.S. at 705).
823 A.2d at 1093.

823 A.2d at 1094.
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sulted from the screening of such films; according to New Garden
Realty, this purpose demonstrated a burden on speech due to its
content.95 The Commonwealth Court did not find either of these
arguments persuasive and held that, according to the precedent of
O'Brien, the trial court did not err in concluding the URA action
should not be subject to strict scrutiny as a content-based restriction on First Amendment rights.9" Having already resolved the
matter under Arcara, the court held that the O'Brien test nonetheless applies and that it was met in this case."
Finally, the Commonwealth Court addressed an argument by
New Garden Realty that the trial court abused its discretion when
it failed to independently analyze New Garden's claims under Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution.9 8 The URA contended that if a burden on speech is not content-based or a prior
restraint, article I, section 7 requires only the standard for a time,
place, and manner restriction under the First Amendment, which
is the review that the trial court had already performed.9 9 New
Garden Realty relied on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in Pap's II to argue that when any communication contemplated by article I, section 7 is involved, intermediate scrutiny
may not apply. 00 The Commonwealth Court first distinguished
Pap'sII from the instant case. 1 ' In Pap's II the Pennsylvania Supreme Court found that the regulation was content-based.'
Here
the Commonwealth Court found the law to be one of general applicability that had some effect on speech and was therefore governed by Arcara."3
The Commonwealth Court then held that even if the article I,
section 7 "least intrusive means" review is applied, the test was
satisfied.'
The court pointed to the record which indicated that
the redevelopment plan involved years of study, and that the URA
determined in its expertise that correcting the blight required ac95. Id.
96. Id. at 1095. The court notes that in City of Renton the Supreme Court held that a
zoning ordinance that restricted the location of adult theatre was a content-neutral time,
place and manner regulation. City of Renton v. Playtime Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
97. Condemnation by URA, 823 A.2d at 1096.
98. Id.
99. Id. See Golden Triangle I and Golden Triangle News, Inc. v. Corbett, 700 A.2d 1056
(Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997).
100. Condemnation by URA, 823 A.2d at 1097.
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id.
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quisition of all of the properties in a three block area for reuse under a coordinated plan. °5 The overall plan of development revolved around the multiple uses planned for the Garden Theatre
and the governmental interest of redevelopment of a large
blighted area would have been "seriously undermined or destroyed" if the Garden Theatre was not acquired. °6 Therefore, the
taking of the Garden Theatre represented the least intrusive
10 7
means of accomplishing the legitimate government interest.
Judge Friedman filed a concurring and dissenting opinion. 8
She agreed with the majority that the condemnation was not subject to strict scrutiny under federal law and that it satisfied the
four-prong intermediate test set forth in O'Brien."°9 She disagreed0
that the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Arcara was applicable.1
Further, in her view, the condemnation did in fact violate the
right to free expression granted by Article I, Section 7 of the Pennsylvania Constitution."'
Judge Friedman found Arcara to be inapplicable because the
general law at issue was directed at "unlawful activity" and had
nothing to do with the books the retailer sold." 2 Therefore the
First Amendment claim was employed as a "cloak for obviously
unlawful public sexual conduct.""' She argued that the redevelopment law as applied in the case at issue is not directed a general unlawful activity that constitutes a public nuisance, but
rather is specifically directed at the "adult" movie theatre and its
secondary effects on the neighborhood." 4 Judge Friedman noted
that in her concurring opinion in Arcara, Justice O'Connor specifically stated that if a city were to close an "adult" bookstore because of the perceived secondary effects of selling the books, the
case would implicate the First Amendment."' Therefore according
to Judge Friedman, Arcara simply does not apply because she believed the URA targeted the Garden Theatre because of its negative secondary effects on the neighborhood."'
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.

Condemnation by URA, 823 A.2d at 1097.
Id. at 1097-98.
Id. at 1098.
Id
Id.
Condemnation by URA, 823 A.2d at 1098.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 1099.
Id.
Condemnation by URA, 823 A.2d at 1099.
Id.
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Next Judge Friedman considered the ordinance under article I,
section 7 based on the Pennsylvania Supreme Court's decision in
Pap's 11.117 She returned to the question of content-neutrality of
the regulation.118 She interpreted Pap's H to require the examination of both the stated and unmentioned purpose of the taking."9
When the stated purpose of the government action is inextricably
bound up with the suppressed protected expression, the government action is content-based. 2 ° Judge Friedman found that one of
the unstated purposes of the taking was to eliminate the screening
of "adult" films in the redevelopment area, and she found the
stated purpose was to improve the negative image associated with
the area because of the display of adult films. 21 Therefore, she
concluded that the stated purpose for taking the Garden Theatre
was inextricably bound up with the suppression of protected expression, making the URA's action content-based.'22
Judge Friedman then argued that the URA's interest in taking
the Garden Theatre was not compelling because she claimed that
if the interest had been compelling the government would have
taken action long ago.'23 Further, Judge Friedman commented
that even if the interest was compelling, a taking was not the least
restrictive means of accomplishing that purpose.'24 She asserted
that it is "apparent that the URA's plans for the other properties
taken under the Redevelopment Area will improve the negative
image of the area without burdening free expression," and suggested that, perhaps when the redevelopment is done, New Garden Realty will decide to change its use to accommodate different
clientele. 125

117. Id.
118. Id. at 1100.
119. Id.
120. Condemnation by URA, 823 A.2d at 1100.
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id. In a footnote Judge Friedman notes that it is clear that the films did not cause
the area's blight, as the reports of blight in the neighborhood went back to the late 1960's,
but the Garden Theatre did not begin to display adult films until the 1970's. Id. Certainly
she is correct that the adult use was not the sole cause of blight; however, it is certainly not
clear that the adult use did not contribute to later blight or a lack of interest in maintenance and redevelopment in the area.
124. Id.
125. Condemnation by URA, 823 A.2d at 1100.
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PennsylvaniaConstitutionalAnalysis Available for the
Pending Decision

Pennsylvania now has the opportunity to consider the limits it
wishes to impose on the government's taking powers when free
speech concerns are implicated. There are several avenues of approach for this ruling. The traditional approach has been to consider the actions of the government to determine if a law burdens
free speech.126 If a law is not concerned with speech, but rather is
to be generally applied, as in Arcara, then the law does not trigger
First Amendment scrutiny at all.'27 Or the law may, in fact, incidentally burden speech. The O'Brien test was adopted by the federal courts specifically for this situation.'28 Although O'Brien has
been considered by the Pennsylvania Supreme Court, it has not
been adopted.'29 If a Pennsylvania court determines that a law
burdens free speech the law must then survive the strict scrutiny
test which requires the regulation to be "narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling government interest." ° Alternatively,
Pennsylvania law will allow the government to incidentally burden speech as to its time, place and manner if this restraint is content-neutral. 3 ' Each of these approaches will be considered below.
Additionally, there is another avenue of analyses available to
the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania under the Commonwealth's
constitution. The text of article I, section 7 grants the right to
"freely speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for
the abuse of that liberty."'32 This language lends itself to an examination of the actions of the speaker instead of the government.
It places a burden on each speaker to use the right to free expression judiciously in order to merit the protection of the state. This
analysis will be evaluated as well.
1.

Arcara - Neutral Laws of GeneralApplicability

The Pennsylvania Supreme Court could uphold the taking of the
Garden Theatre under Arcara. In Arcara, the U.S. Supreme
Court held that the First Amendment was not implicated by the
126. Pap'sH, 812 A.2d at 611.
127. Arcara,478 U.S. at 707.
128. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
129. Pap's H, 812 A.2d at 611.
130. Id. at 612.
131. Golden Triangle News, Inc. v. Corbett, 689 A.2d 974, 981 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1997).
132. PA. CONST. art. I, § 7.
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enforcement of a regulation of general application against the
physical premises that happened to retail books.133 The Court in
Arcara noted that First Amendment scrutiny was appropriate
only when regulations were aimed at controlling conduct that included significant expressive activity or where a statute based on
non-expressive activity had the inevitable effect of signaling out
The law in Arcara was a
those engaged in expressive activity.'
3 ' The law in the inapplicability.
law
of
general
public nuisance
stant case is a condemnation law which is also generally applicaThe Arble to all properties certified as blighted in Pittsburgh.'
on
the
booksellers
cara Court noted specifically that the burden
imposes no actual restraint on the dissemination of particular materials, rather only a restriction on the location of distribution,
even if such locations are difficult to find.'37 Ultimately the Arcara
Court held neither the press nor bookseller may claim special protection from laws of general applicability simply by virtue of their
First Amendment protected activities.'
So it should be with the Garden Theatre. The Theater is merely
one of 47 properties slated for condemnation and redevelopment
by the URA. The law does not single out speech activities, and the
speech activities at the Garden Theatre are restricted only by location. There is no ban on the dissemination of adult movies. The
holding in Arcara should govern this matter unless the Pennsylvania Supreme Court were to find sufficient evidence on the record that the City used the general condemnation law as a pretext
for closing down the theatre because it screens adult films or because of the perceived secondary effects of having such an establishment in the neighborhood. In her concurrence to Arcara, Justice O'Conner noted that it was error to apply a First Amendment
standard of review where the government is regulating neither
speech nor an incidental, non-expressive effect of speech. 1 9 But
Justice O'Conner cautioned that the First Amendment would be
133. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 707.
134. Id. at 707-08.
135. Id. at 699.
136. Condemnation by URA, 823 A.2d at 1089. Judge Friedman would like to distinguish the laws because the law in Arcara was a public nuisance law and the law used by
the URA was a condemnation law. Id. at 1099. This reading of Arcara is extremely narrow
and ignores the rationale that laws of general applicability, not aimed at speech or singularly burdensome to speech are not subject to First Amendment scrutiny. Arcara, 478 U.S.
at 707.
137. Arcara, 478 U.S. at 706.
138. Id.
139. Id. at 708 (O'Connor, J., concurring).

506

Duquesne Law Review

Vol. 44

implicated if the government used a neutral law to target speech
or negative secondary effects of speech. 4 ' So any colorable indication of a speech targeting motive would make Arcara inapplicable.
2.

O'Brien - IntermediateScrutiny and
the PennsylvaniaConstitution

If the Pennsylvania Supreme Court does not uphold the decision
under Arcara, then it might reconsider the O'Brien test which
governs statutes that regulate conduct but also have the incidental effect of burdening speech or expression. Under O'Brien the
taking would likely pass constitutional muster. The URA took
action that was within the constitutional power of the government
by initiating a condemnation proceeding. The URA had an important or substantial government interest to combat blight and save
deteriorating properties for a public use. These interests are unrelated to the suppression of free speech inasmuch as the URA has a
comprehensive plan to take 47 properties, only one of which happened to be able to claim the protection of the First Amendment.14 '
This restriction to First Amendment freedom is no greater than is
essential to further the government interest because it is simply a
restriction on the place where New Garden Realty can disseminate its message, not a complete ban of that message, and because
the government interest in fighting blight demands compressive
neighborhood redevelopment according to a well-documented plan.
Further, if one of the goals of the project is to improve the negative
image of the neighborhood then removing the adult use may be
well neigh essential.
Historically, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania has declined to
create an intermediate scrutiny test for free speech issues under
the Pennsylvania Constitution. 4 1 In Pap's II the court held that
an intermediate level of scrutiny, such as is set forth in O'Brien,
was inappropriate where expressive conduct like nude dancing
was involved.14 ' The court expressed the concern that a standard
140. Id.
141. Much as in G. & A. Books, it strains credibility to imagine that the city would plant
the redevelopment of three square blocks at a large expenditure for the sole purpose of
stopping one of 47 properties from displaying adult films. The total expenditure for the
Federal/North Redevelopment Project was initially slated at 40 million dollars. Suzanne
Elliott, Owner of Garden Theatre Appeals Decision Allowing Property Seizure, PrIV"SBURG
BUS. TIMES, June 14, 2002.
142. Pap's 11, 812 A.2d at 610.
143. Id. at 612.
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which balances a stated purpose of a statute against the extent of
its impact on protected expression is one upon "which reasonable
minds could disagree," and therefore provides insufficient protection to fundamental rights guaranteed under article I, section 7V1,
Instead of applying an intermediate test in Pap's H the court applied strict scrutiny and decided that "an obvious purpose" of the
4
Erie ordinance was to burden free speech itself.'
The City Council of Erie had stated that it adopted the provision for the "purpose
of limiting a recent increase in nude live entertainment within the
City" which, it believed, led to negative secondary effects, i.e.," an
atmosphere conducive to violence, sexual harassment, public intoxication, prostitution, the spread of sexually transmitted diseases, and other deleterious effects." 4 '
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court considered Justice White's
analysis in Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc.:
The purpose of forbidding people to appear nude in parks,
beaches, hot dog stands, and like public places is to protect others from offense. But that could not possibly be
the purpose of preventing nude dancing in theaters and
barrooms since the viewers are exclusively consenting
adults who pay money to see these dances. The purpose
of the proscription in these contexts is to protect the
viewers from what the State believes is the harmful message that nude dancing communicates."'
Beyond that reasonable conclusion remains the fact that the express purpose of the Erie ordinance was to limit nude live entertainment, which is expressive conduct. This is distinguishable
from the case at hand.
In the case of the Garden Theatre the regulation at issue was in
fact a general law that allowed the City to take property to combat
blight, not a law which in any way targeted speech. The Urban
Redevelopment Law states that its purpose is to "promote elimination of blighted areas and supply sanitary housing in areas
throughout the Commonwealth; by declaring acquisition, sound
re-planning and redevelopment of such areas to be for the promo144. Id. at 611.
145. Id. at 612.
146. Id. at 595-96.
147. Pap's II, 812 A.2d at 596-97 (citing Barnes v. Glen Theatre, Inc. 501 U.S. 560, 594
(1991)).
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tion of health, safety, convenience and welfare." ' Unlike the Erie
ordinance, it is not obvious that the purpose of the law is to burden free speech. The purpose of the law is to combat urban blight,
it does not even mention speech or expressive activities. Therefore, the law, on its face, is content-neutral, even if it incidentally
burdens protected speech activities. Consequently, the facts of the
Garden Theatre case present an opportunity to reconsider the
question of an intermediate scrutiny test in Pennsylvania which
would be designed to analyze situations where speech is only burdened incidentally.
In order to ensure that the level of scrutiny applied provided
adequate protection for fundamental rights, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania could adopt the O'Brien test as suggested by Justice
Souter in Paps J. 14 1 Justice Souter demanded an evidentiary showing of "real harms" so that the remedy by the government could be
evaluated as to the likelihood that it would be efficient at mitigatIf the Pennsylvania Supreme Court aling these actual harms.'
lowed the taking of the Garden Theatre under this standard, it
would extend the protection of the Pennsylvania Constitution to
require the government to act only to curtail real harm caused by
properties in blighted neighborhoods. This would protect speech
activity and protect property owners from government intrusion
unless that intrusion was tailored to mitigate real harms. 5 '
3.

Strict Scrutiny

Strict scrutiny will be applied to any form of government action
that suppresses, disadvantages, or burdens speech because of its
content." 2 The URA has stated that the proposed taking was initiated to preserve and restore all the buildings in the redevelopment area at a cost of $12.4 million and that the Garden Theatre
building is the largest and most centrally located on the block and
148. Urban Redevelopment Law, Act of May 24, 1945, P.L. 991, as amended, 35 P.S. §§
1701-1719.2.
149. Pap'sI, 529 U.S. at 314.
150. Id. at 317.
151. It is interesting to note, however, that Justice Souter proposed an evidentiary showing that proved that a law against public nudity would actually impact the negative secondary effects surrounding establishments featuring adult entertainment. Id. at 315. He
specifically comments that a zoning regulation would be a viable regulation achieving the
government's interest with less restriction on speech. Id. The condemnation action at
issue is arguably more akin to a zoning regulation than a general ban on public nudity.
151. Condemnation by URA, 823 A.2d at 1094 (citing Turner Broadcasting System, Inc.
v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)).
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its acquisition is necessary to insure URA site control.'5 3 This rationale is certainly unrelated to the suppression of speech. But,
Mr. Androtsakis, as sole shareholder of New Garden Realty, has
argued that the URA's stated purpose in precluding adult films
from the Redevelopment Area is to change the "negative image"
that, in its opinion, results from showing adult films.'54 If the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court should find sufficient evidence of
animus towards speech, then it could apply strict scrutiny and
require the regulation to be "narrowly drawn to accomplish a compelling government interest."55
To meet this burden, the City would have to show that its interest in reducing urban blight and crime was compelling and that
taking the Garden Theatre would be the least intrusive means to
'
accomplish that goal. 56
In Pap's H, the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court noted Justice White's statement in Barnes that there are
several ways to combat social ills that fall short of an absolute
ban.'5 7 In the context of a ban on nude dancing, Justice White
suggested that "the State could perhaps require that, while performing, nude performers remain at all times a certain minimum
distance from spectators, that nude entertainment be limited to
certain hours, or even that establishments providing such entertainment be dispersed throughout the city." 5 ' The Supreme Court
of Pennsylvania has seemingly endorsed Justice White's view that
restrictions on the location of speech can survive strict scrutiny if
there is a compelling government interest. The location of the
speech that takes place in a theatre could be preemptively regulated by zoning or regulated after the fact by eminent domain.
This type of regulation would place a time, place, and manner restriction on the expression without creating a complete ban. 9

152. Condemnation by URA, 823 A.2d at 1095.
153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Pap'sH, 812 A.2d at 612.
156. Id.
157. Id. (citing Barnes, 501 U.S. at 594).
159. See Golden Triangle News, Inc., 689 A.2d at 981. Early Pennsylvania decisions
took the view that time, place, and manner restrictions on free speech did not raise a constitutional issue at all. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Grochowiak, 136 A.2d 145 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 1958).
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Time, Place and Manner

Under City of Renton, reasonable time, place and manner regulations of protected speech are valid if: (1) they are justified without reference to the content of the regulated speech; (2) they are
narrowly tailored to serve a significant or substantial government
interest; and (3) they leave open ample alternative channels of
communication. 160 The URA's taking of the Garden Theatre is justifiable without reference to the content of the regulated speech
because the law does not seek to regulate the speech, it seeks to
combat blight and the deterioration of buildings in the redevelopment area. The law applies equally to the 46 properties that had
non-protected uses and it does to the one property that had a use
with speech implications. The taking is narrowly tailored to serve
the significant or substantial government interest in combating
urban decay, increasing the tax base, and rehabilitating historically significant buildings. The properties in the three-block area
are not well-maintained or abandoned, and there is a high level of
crime in the area. Taking the properties under a comprehensive
redevelopment plan created with input from the community as to
the needs that the business district should serve is narrowly tailored to these ends. The regulation leaves open abundant alternative channels of communication. It is not necessary that this one
business be able to communicate its message, rather that there is
ample access in Pittsburgh to adult films. Closing one theatre in
one location will not affect many other channels available to disseminate the erotic message.
5.

Article I, Section 7 and Responsibility

The text of the Pennsylvania Constitution offers protection to
"freely speak, write and print on any subject, being responsible for
the abuse of that liberty."' Commonwealth v. Edmunds sets forth
a model for Pennsylvania constitutional analysis.'62 Under Edmunds, the court should consider: (1) the text of the relevant
Pennsylvania Constitutional provision; (2) its history, including
Pennsylvania case law; (3) relevant cases, if any, from other jurisdictions; (4) policy considerations, including unique issues of state

160.
161.
162.

City of Renton, 475 U.S. at 41.
PA. CONST. art. I, § 7 (emphasis added).
586 A.2d 887 (Pa. 1991).
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and local concern and the impact on Pennsylvania jurisprudence.'63
Article I, section 7(b) provides: "The free communication of
thoughts and opinions is one of the invaluable rights of man, and
every citizen may freely speak, write and print on any subject,
being responsible for the abuse of that liberty."" Protection of
speech was incorporated into the Pennsylvania Constitution in
1776, a decade and a half before the adoption of the federal Bill of
Rights. 61 5 The 1776 Declaration of Rights claimed a right of
speech, press, assembly and petition.166 This first Pennsylvania
Constitution encouraged a profusion of debate but also a proliferaThe most notable, Respublica v.
tion of libel prosecutions."'
Oswald, caused lawmakers to consider limitations on a policy of
unrestrained speech.168 In Oswald, a contentious newspaper editor, Eleazer Oswald, was arrested after he published several
anonymous articles impugning the character of Andrew Browne,
Oswald rethe master of a female academy in Philadelphia. 9
sponded to his arrest by issuing a scathing attack against both the
plaintiffs and the court itself.7 ' Chief Justice Thomas McKean
recognized the constitutional right to publish opinions, but also
that publications "meant to delude and defame" were nonetheless
subject to punishment. 7 ' When the Pennsylvania Constitution
was rewritten in 1790, the new article I, section 7 was altered to
include a provision requiring responsibility over the exercise of the
liberty of free speech.'
The Superior Court of Pennsylvania discussed this constitutional revision in Long v. 130 Market Street Gift and Novelty of
Johnstown.'73 The court noted that the 1776 Constitution did not
address the question of responsibility, but that the apparent absolute nature of the guarantee soon gave rise to a need to limit pro-

163. Id. at 985.
164. PA. CONST. art. I, § 7.
165. Pap's11, 812 A.2d at 605 (Article I, Section 7 "isan ancestor, not a stepchild of the
First Amendment.")
166. PA. CONST. of 1776, DECLARATION OF RIGHTS, art. XII and XVI.
167. See GORMLEY & BAUMAN, supra note 43, § 10.1.
168. Respublica v. Oswald, 1 U.S. (1 Dali.) 319 (Pa. 1788).
169. Id. at 319.
170. Id. at 319-20.
171. Id. at 326.
172. Phillip A. Hamburger, Natural Rights, Natural Law, and American Constitutions,
102 YALE L. J. 907, 960 n.113. (1993).
173. 440 A.2d 517 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1982).
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tection from prosecution. 174 The court noted that there are two
distinct elements to the right to freedom of expression." 5 The first
right, which is arguably absolute, is the right to speak publicly
itself.'
The second guarantee is a right to protection from prosecution7 7for the abuse of that freedom, and it is a much more limited
right.'
The revised constitutional text recognizes that even fundamental liberties can be abused and that the state may use its police
powers to punish those who use their liberty to infringe on the
rights of others. In Commonwealth v. Widovich, the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court held that the legislature would determine in the
first instance what speech would constitute abuse through use of
its police power.' s Pennsylvania has recognized limitations in the
area of obscenity and sedition. 9 In Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile
Workers Union of America, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
noted, "Freedom of speech gives no right of intimidation or coercion and no right to damage or injure another's business or property. " ' So, one may speak, but one may also expect to be held
accountable if that exercise infringes on the rights of others.
Other states with identical constitutional language have also
concluded that speech rights do have limits. In City of Farmington v. Fawcett, the Court of Appeals of New Mexico recognized the
limitations inherent in the New Mexico Constitution, "After granting citizens the right to speak freely, our constitution makes each
person 'responsible for the abuse of that right.' A citizen who
'abuses' the right of free speech may be legally liable." 8' The court
recognized the need to balance speech with other constitutionally
protected rights and held that obscenity could be an abuse of free
speech.' 2 The Supreme Court of Tennessee considered the issue
174. Long, 440 A.2d at 524.
175. Id.
176. Id.
177. Id. at 524-25.
178. 145 A. 295 (Pa. 1929).
179. See Long, 440 A.2d at 526 (holding that "there is in Pennsylvania no fundamental
right to protection from prosecution for the publication of matter abusive of the right to free
expression.. ."). See also Widovich, 145 A. at 295, 299 (holding '[wihen one freely speaks or
prints, he is responsible, through the process provided by law, to the people or the individual aggrieved, if that liberty is abused.").
180. Wortex Mills, Inc. v. Textile Workers Union of America, 85 A.2d 851, 854 (Pa. 1952)
(holding "[fireedom of speech is not absolute or unlimited either under the United States
Constitution, or the Pennsylvania Constitution.").
181. City of Farmington v. Fawcett, 843 P.2d 839, 843 (N.M. Ct. App. 1992).
182. City of Farmington,843 P.2d at 843.
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in State v. Marshall.8 ' Because the Tennessee Constitution
adopted the language of the Pennsylvania Constitution, the Tennessee high court relied on Pennsylvania caselaw to hold that citizens have a limited right to protection from prosecution arising
from the exercise of free speech which is forfeit if the publication is
somehow "destructive of the ends of society." 1"4 So the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania is not alone in an interpretation of its constitutional language which includes a limit on the protection provided for free speech.
Sound jurisprudential policy also requires a prohibition of abuse
of the speech right. It is clear that Pennsylvania has a strong policy interest in protecting the right of free expression. But it has
an equally strong policy interest in other constitutional guarantees. Article I, Section 27 of the Pennsylvania Constitution provides that "[tihe people have a right to clean air, pure water, and
the preservation of the natural, scenic, historic and esthetic values
of the environment."" 5 In United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v.
City of Philadelphia, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania held
that article I, section 27 "reflects a general public interest in preserving historical landmarks" so that an ordinance which allowed
historic designation was constitutional.'86 So the citizens of Pennsylvania have a public right to the preservation of buildings of historic value. This right must be balanced with the right of freedom
of expression.
Certainly, if the owner of the Garden Theatre, Mr. Androtsakis,
has abused his right to expression and unfairly infringed on the
rights of others, then the state would be justified in a refusal to
protect this abuse. The next step is to determine if an abuse of the
speech right has in fact occurred. It would arguably be an abuse
of the freedom of speech if that speech in fact caused real harm to
the community. If the City of Pittsburgh could prove a causal
connection between crime and neighborhood blight and the display

183. State v. Marshall, 859 S.W.2d 289 (Tenn. 1993).
184. Id. at 293. See WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 4 COMMENTARIES, 151-152.
185. PA. CONST. art. I, § 27.
186. United Artists Theater Circuit, Inc. v. City of Philadelphia, 595 A.2d 6, 9, 12 (Pa.
1991) (The court allowed that the ordinance designating historic property was constitutional itself, but that under Article I, Section 10 of-the Pennsylvania Constitution, the designation was an unconstitutional taking if the property owner was forced to assume the
responsibility to preserve the historical nature of the property without just compensation).
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of pornographic films, then the City would have a right to curtail
that speech.'8 7
The City of Pittsburgh cannot claim that the display of pornography alone is an abuse of speech as the Pennsylvania Supreme
Court has held that the screening of adult movies in and of itself
does not constitute a public nuisance at common law."' But it is
important to remember that it is not the display of pornography
itself that the city seeks to remedy. The city seeks to combat
blight and urban decay and it is that injury which is targeted by
the redevelopment plan. The plan serves the interests of the
members of the community who have a right under the Pennsylvania Constitution to esthetic and historic preservation. So it is
not simply in issue that Mr. Androtsakis displays pornographic
films, but also that he does so in a building that suffers from neglect and decay. The message alone may not be enough to point to
abuse of the liberty of speech, but Mr. Androtsakis has chosen to
publish this message in a manner which burdens the community.
Speech activity should not insulate a venue from general laws
concerning appropriate maintenance and upkeep. And yet the
Garden Theatre has peeling, painted plywood tacked over many of
its front windows and the marquee is illuminated only sporadically. In fact, the "N" of "Garden" is the only letter which remains
lit. Trash litters the street around the entrance and the molding
and exterior decoration is broken and falling. The display of adult
films alone may not be an abuse of speech, but speech which is
used as a shield to defeat community standards of safety and esthetics may well be.
From a policy standpoint, the court creates an inconsistent
standard if a speech right can defeat a general law enacted to protect the public interest in the preservation of a neighborhood. The
City of Pittsburgh exercised the power of eminent domain against
47 properties in a 3-block area in order to complete a 40-million
dollar renewal project. 88 Only one property, the Garden Theatre,
had a colorable claim to free speech protection. It is difficult to
argue that the City might expend such a large amount of resources solely to target the speech at the Garden Theatre. But
187. "The power and the duty of the State to take adequate steps to preserve the peace
and to protect the privacy, the lives, and the property of its residents cannot be doubted."
Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 105 (1940).
188. Commonwealth v. MacDonald, 347 A.2d 290, 301 (Pa. 1975).
189. Suzanne Elliott, Owner of Garden Theatre Appeals Decision Allowing Property
Seizure, PITTSBURGH Bus. TIMES, June 14, 2002.
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even though Mr. Androtsakis's speech is only burdened incidentally, he retains an ability to protect an otherwise valid taking
that is unavailable to the owners of the remaining 46 properties,
while keeping his property in a state of disrepair. By claiming
that it is his speech that is targeted rather than the dilapidated
state of his building, Mr. Androtsakis frustrates the legitimate
interest of the government in the combat of blight and the constitutional right of his neighbors to enjoy a historic landmark. It
would seem inconsistent to allow one property owner a defense to
eminent domain that was not available to the owners of the 46
other properties which included restaurants, a barbershop, and
homes. These are surely places which provide a forum for freedom
of expression to flourish, and yet the Commonwealth clearly authorizes the taking of private homes and businesses for public use
in spite of the speech that may occur inside.
So the there are two ways in which Mr. Androtsakis' display of
pornographic films might be abusive of speech. First, the City of
Pittsburgh could attempt to prove a causal connection between the
screening of adult films and the crime and blight in the surrounding community. This is consistent with an O'Brien analysis as
delineated by Justice Souter."9 ° The evidentiary standard would
require an actual showing of harm. If a causal connection could be
drawn between the screening of pornographic films in a dilapidated building and negative secondary effects on the neighborhood, then article I, section 7 would certainly require that Mr. Androtsakis be held responsible for the abuse of his speech liberty in
causing his neighborhood harm. This is a high burden which
would ensure that only non-abusive speech received full protection
Curtailing this abuse
under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
would remain constitutional even if the court found that the City
had targeted speech activities concurrent with the legitimate aim
of combating urban blight.
Additionally, absent any finding that the City in fact targeted
the Mr. Androtsakis' speech and not the condition of his property,
the court could constitutionally find that Mr. Androtsakis has
abused his privilege of expression by using his speech activities as
a shield to maintain his property in a state which has a deleterious effect on his neighbors and their constitutional right to an aesthetic and safe neighborhood. Either way, the taking restricts
190. Pap'sI, 529 U.S. at 311 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). See note
80 supra.
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only the location in which Mr. Androtsakis can disseminate his
message, it does not impinge on his right to speak in the first
place. This means that the absolute right to speech remains intact, subject only to reasonable regulation if that speech causes
harm.
V.

CONCLUSION

The government's power of eminent domain is broad as long as
a taking will benefit the public. The First Amendment of the U.S.
Constitution allows a property owner to defeat a taking if the
owner can prove that the government used its takings power to
infringe upon free speech. But if that expressive activity is not the
target of the taking, but is only incidentally burdened by an action
in which the government has substantial interest, then a taking
will be constitutional. Under federal law, the Garden Theatre
case is likely to be decided in favor of the government.
Pennsylvania has a history of providing a heightened level of
protection for speech under the Pennsylvania Constitution.
Unlike the federal government, Pennsylvania has not adopted an
intermediate level of scrutiny which recognizes some laws burden
speech in only an incidental manner. The Pennsylvania Supreme
Court may take the opportunity of the Garden Theatre case to reconsider this position. If it did so, it would be consistent with
Pennsylvania tradition of a heightened protection for speech if the
Court were to adopt the evidentiary standard recommended by
Justice Souter in Pap'sI which would require an actual showing of
"real harm."'91 This would allow the court to evaluate the likelihood that the proposed government action could in fact mitigate
an actual problem. Under this analysis, only speech which was
actually irresponsible would be restricted.
The Pennsylvania Constitution recognizes the possibility that
some speech activity may cause harm by making citizen responsible for the abuse of speech liberties. The court should consider
this language in light of the fact that speech activity may in fact
cause real harm. The court should further consider that speech
which is concurrent with real harm, such as blighted property conditions, has the potential to be used as a shield to frustrate the

191.

Pap's 1, 529 U.S. at 311.
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ability of the government to remedy that harm. The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania should develop a test to distinguish the difference between speech that should be protected and irresponsible
speech that impermissibly trammels the rights of others.
Sarah Andrews

